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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT BARBARA LYNN BUNCH

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 21-7-3 (1991)
Impecunious litigants - Affidavit
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend
and appeal any cause in any court in the state
by taking and subscribing, before any officer
authorized
to
administer
an
oath,
the
following:
I,A,B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the
expenses of the action or legal proceedings
which I am about to commence (or the appeal
which I am about to t a k e ) , and that I verily
believe I am justly entitled to the relief
sought by such action, legal proceedings or
appeal.

RULE 10(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Enforcement by clerk: waiver for pro se parties

1

The clerk of the court shall examine all
pleadings and other papers filed with the
court. If they are not prepared in conformity
with this rule, the clerk shall accept the
filing but may require counsel to substitute
properly prepared papers for nonconforming
papers.
RULE 3(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Filing appeals from final orders and judgments
Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal
does not affect the validity of the appeal,
but is grounds only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
RULE 3(f), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals
At the time of filing any notice of separate,
joint, or cross-appeal in a civil case, the
party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk
of the trial court such filing as are
established by law, and also the fee for
docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept
a notice of appeal unless the filing and
docketing fees are paid.
RULE 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
Appeal from final judgment and order
In a case in which an appeal is permitted as a
matter of right from the trial court to the
appellate court, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial court within 30 dyas after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.
However, when a judgment or order is entered
in a statutory forcible entry or unlawful
detainer action, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
trial court within 10 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed from.

2

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE APPEAL WAS TIMELY FILED
Englehorn argues that this court has no jurisdiction to hear
the appeal because the appeal was not- filed within thirty days of
the filing of the trial court order*

While Englehorn admits that

a filing took place within thirty days, he claims the filing was a
nullity because no fee was paid and because the affidavit of
impecuniosity filed in lieu of the fee was defective•

Englehorn

argues that the affidavit was defective because Bunch did not raise
her hand and swear an oath to its truthfulness before signing.
Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 (1991) provides that:
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend
and appeal any cause in any court in this
state by taking and subscribing, before any
officer authorized to administer an oath, the
following:
I,A,B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that
owing to my poverty I am unable to bear the
expenses of the action or legal proceedings
which I am about to commence (or the appeal
which I am about to take), and that I verily
believe I am justly entitled to the relief
sought by such action, legal proceedings or
appeal.
The operative language of this section, as pointed out by the
trial judge, is the phrase, ". . .by taking and subscribing . . .
M

The trial judge stated:
The language requires only that the affiant
take the prescribed affidavit to a person
authorized to administer oaths and there,
before that officer, subscribe to the
affidavit.
There is no requirement in the
statute that the affiant actually swear to an
oath in addition to subscribing to the
affidavit. If the legislature intended that
3

an oath be given other than the one that must
be subscribed before a person authorized to
administer oaths, it could have easily so
provided.
Bunch did all that was required by the statute.
Rule

10(f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in

pertinent part:
The clerk of the court shall examine all
pleadings and other papers filed with the
court. If they are not prepared in conformity
with this rule, the clerk shall accept the
filing but may require counsel to substitute
properly prepared papers for nonconforming
papers.
If § 21-7-3 requires Bunch to raise her hand and take an oath
before signing an affidavit of impecuniosity, the clerk under Rule
10(f) can still accept Bunch's affidavit but require her to
substitute a corrected affidavit for the nonconforming one.

The

rule allows Bunch the opportunity to return to the notary, explain
the problem, and sign a new affidavit after raising her hand and
swearing an oath.

While Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

requires an appeal to be filed within 30 days from the entry of the
judgment or order, it does not require that the appeal be dismissed
because a supporting affidavit of impecuniosity is not correct in
every detail.
witnessing

It is submitted that historically most notaries

affidavits of impecuniosity have not required the

parties to raise their hand and swear to an oath. The law must be
flexible enough to allow for mistakes of this nature to be
corrected, otherwise, a party's fate will rest in the hands of the
notary he or she may choose to use.
4

Rule 3(a), Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure, recognizes this in stating:
Failure of an appellant to take any step other
than the timely filing of a notice of appeal
does not affect the validity of the appeal,
but is grounds only for such action as the
appellate court deems appropriate, which may
include dismissal of the- appeal or other
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the
award of attorney fees.
Englehorn cites Rule 3(f), Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure,
as support for his position.

The rule states:

At the time of filing any notice of separate,
joint, or cross-appeal in a civil case, the
party taking the appeal shall pay to the clerk
of the trial court such filing as are
established by law, and also the fee for
docketing the appeal in the appellate court.
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept
a notice of appeal unless the filing and
docketing fees are paid.
Bunch believes Rule 3(f) is saying that if one is not impecunious,
a fee must be paid by that person. The statute does no apply here
because Bunch was impecunious at the time she commenced her appeal.
Section 21-7-3 pertains to her situation and simply requires that
she file an affidavit of impecuniosity with her notice of appeal.
Bunch did that.
Englehorn points out that in McClain v. Conrad, 431 P. 2d 571
(Utah 1967) an appeal was dismissed because the filing fee was not
paid until after the time for filing an appeal had run, though the
notice of appeal had been left with the clerk prior to the appeal
deadline.

In this case no filing fee was involved and a filing

took place within the prescribed period.
McClain is distinguishable from this case.

5

For these reasons,

POINT TWO
THE JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH
PREJUDICE IS AN APPEALABLE ORDER
Englehorn argues that the judgment of dismissal with prejudice
is not a final order because the issue of attorney fees remains
open.

It appears that on the one hand Englehorn is stating that

the appeal must be dismissed because it was not filed within thirty
days, and on the other hand, that the case is not yet ripe for
appeal.

It is clear to Bunch that the ruling of the trial court

was a final order.

The trial judge stated:

1. That Plaintiff's Complaint in this action
should be and it hereby is, dismissed with
prejudice and upon the merits, for the reason
that no court or administrative order was ever
obtained
establishing
the
parties'
relationship as a marriage within the required
time limits.
2.
That should Defendant desired to claim
attorney fees pursuant to UCA 78-27-56 (1953,
as amended), he may do so through the filing
of an appropriate motion, with appropriate
supporting affidavit and memorandum, in order
to give Plaintiff ample opportunity to
respond. (Record on Appeal, pp. 000114-115.)
In essence, the trial judge ordered that Bunch's complaint be
dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits and that Englehorn
have the right to pursue attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-27-56 (1992) if desired.
all claims of the parties.

That ruling was final and adjudged

Bunch's complaint was dismissed with

prejudice and upon the merits and Englehorn's claim to puruse
attorney fees was granted. Bunch seeks to overturn those rulings.
6

POINT THREE
BUNCH IS NOT RAISING ANY ISSUES
FOR THE FIRST TIME-ON APPEAL
In this action the court dismissed Bunch's complaint with
prejudice and upon the merits and ruled that Englehorn could pursue
attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1992), if he
chose.

Bunch has appealed that ruling by claiming that the trial

court erred in finding that Bunch could not obtain a common law
marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 because more than
one year had elapsed since her relationship with Englehorn ended.
Clearly, that issue was before the trial court.
trial Englehorn moved

the court to dismiss

At the time of

the complaint. He

stated:
Based on counsel's opening statement, we move
to dismiss any claims based upon a common-law
marriage based upon Subsection (2) of the
statute . . . for the reason that by her own
admission and statement, the relationship —
even if there were such a relation ship —
which we don't admit —
terminated in the
middle of August 1990 and as of this date in
1993, there has never been any establishment
by an administrative agency or by the Court
that
such a relationship
constituted
a
statutory marriage.
Bunch responded by saying:
Well, I
— I guess I'm confused.
I — I
thought filing a Complaint was to . . . to
accomplish that very purpose to have that
determination made. And because the trial has
now occurred much more than a year since the
relationship terminated, I can't see how that
would —
that should prejudice Ms. Bunch
7

simply because the trial has now occurred more
than a year after.
The court then stated:
I don't see any authority there that says that
the time is tolled from — from the point when
you file a Complaint, . ^ . It says clearly
that the determination or establishment of the
marriage must occur within the relationship or
within one year following the termination of
the relationship.
And admittedly by the
facts, it hasn't occurred, has it?
Bunch replied:
Well, —
if that's the way your going to
interpret the statute, then I'm going to have
to admit that, yes, but I — I guess I would
have some concerns about the constitutionality
of such a statute when it would make it —
when a person files a Complaint to have that
determination made, and simply because of the
delays and court time and that sort of thing,
it can't get it to court.
The court later stated:
And I don't think that's a constitutional
question, because I think your entitled to
bring a motion right at the outset of the case
to have the Court examine this very issue and
determine whether or not there's a valid
marriage and establish that before we proceed
with the issue of whether you can get a
divorce.
Bunch then stated:
Well, if that's the interpretation of the
statute, then I've got to — to concede that I
don't have anything to contest that. (Record
on Appeal, pp. 000145-147.)
The quotations only reflect part of the discussion that took place
on this issue, but they illustrate the point that at the time of
trial the constitutionality of the statute in question was at
issue.

Bunch has simply appealed the court's interpretation of
8

that statute.

Bunch was not required to detail her reasons for

arguing that a complaint need only be filed within one year of the
separation of the parties.
The issue of attorney fees was also clearly raised at the time
of trial.

Englehorn asked the court to allow him to pursue

attorney fees, pursuant to § 78-27-56 on the basis that Englehorn's
complaint was frivolous. The court stated that Englehorn could do
that in motion form at some time in the future on giving proper
notice to Bunch.
well.

Bunch appealed that part of the court order as

(Record on Appeal, pp. 000153-154.)

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully submitted
that the allegations raised by Englehorn in his brief are without
merit and that the decision of the trial court to dismiss Bunch's
complaint with prejudice and upon the merits based on section (2)
of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5 was in error. The trial court should
have found section (2) to be a one year statute of limitations from
the time of the parties separation. Otherwise, section (2) must be
interpreted

as a statute of repose and unconstitutional

for

violating Article I, section 11 and Article I, section 7 of our
Utah constitution. The order of the trial court dismissing Bunch's
complaint with prejudice should be reversed and the trial court
instructed to set the matter for trial on Bunch's complaint and
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Englehorn's answer•
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